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Abstract
Some works of fiction are widely held by critics to have little
value, yet these works are not only popular but also widely
admired in ways that are not always appreciated.  In this
paper I make use of Kendall Walton’s account of fictional
worlds to argue that fictional worlds can and often do have
value, including aesthetic value, that is independent of the
works that create them.  In the process, I critique Walton’s
notion of fictional worlds and offer a defense of the study and
appreciation of fictional worlds, as distinguished from the
works of fiction with which they are associated.
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1. Introduction 
It is hard for serious readers and critics to understand why
certain works of fiction are as popular and successful as they
are.  For example, from the time of its publication through
today, the critical response to J.R.R. Tolkien’s trilogy, The Lord
of the Rings,  has been resoundingly negative: critics derided
it for its plodding, pedantic style, its overly complex plot, its
heavy-handed self-importance, and its simplistic character
psychology.[1]  Yet The Lord of the Rings’ popularity is
enduring. It has won several readers’polls for the best book of
the twentieth century and even of the second millennium.[2] 
So The Lord of the Rings is not merely popular; those who like
it think that its popularity is deserved.  What accounts for the
divide in opinion between ordinary readers and critics? 
One might argue that, considered as a literary work, The Lord
of the Rings has been underrated by critics who look down on
genre fiction, perhaps particularly on science fiction and
fantasy.  There certainly might be something to this.  Works of
genre fiction, and particularly of “pulpy” and juvenile genres,
are not given a fair chance by some critics, and no doubt some
gems have been overlooked. [3]  However, this is not the line
of argument I will pursue in this paper.  I concede that The
Lord of the Rings, considered merely as a literary work, is not
one of the gems.  However, I will argue, it should not be
judged merely as a literary work; it should be judged also in
terms of its contribution to the development of a fictional
world.
My view is that critics and fans tend approach works like The
Lord of the Rings very differently.  The critics evaluate works
of fiction on their own merits considered as art objects, while
fans evaluate some  works of fiction in terms of their
contribution to a larger project: establishing and exploring
fictional worlds.[4]  Many fans of Star Wars, for example,
were disappointed by the “prequel” films released in the
1990s, not just because they were bad films (though they
are), but also because they seemed to diminish or distort the
world of Star Wars , which had been created and explored in
earlier films.  It is the purpose of this paper to explain how it
can be reasonable for fans to evaluate certain artworks
according to the artworks’ creation of and contribution to a
fictional world.  It is necessary to say something about the
kind of value that fictional worlds can have so that we can
explain how some works of art and related artifacts (books,
television programs, comic books, video games, etc.) are
appropriately valued in terms of their relationship to these
fictional worlds. 
The structure of the paper is as follows:  First, I describe the
relationship between fictional works and fictional worlds, with
particular focus on a class of central cases of works where the
associated world seems to take on an independent
importance.  The central cases I have in mind are mostly
works of science fiction and fantasy, such as the novels,
television programs, films, comic books, and so on, that are
collectively grouped together, such as Star Trek, Dune, the X-
Men,  and the like.  However, the central cases are not always
works of fantasy or science-fiction.  The world of Sherlock
Holmes, for example, may be included in this class.  In the
second section, I show that these works (and sometimes
others) are valued for their relationship to fictional worlds.  I
do so by exploring three objects of fan interest: non-artwork
objects that allow fans to interact with, represent, or imagine
fictional worlds (in Walton’s sense, “props”); fictional puzzles
and debates; and other creative forms of fictional interaction
besides the work itself, particularly what is called “fan fiction.”
In the third section I explore a central challenge to this sort of
evaluative attitude: why should works be valued in terms of
their relationship to worlds, rather than the other way around?
  Insofar as some fans do value The Lord of the Rings because
of its relationship to Middle-Earth (the fictional world of that
work), why would we not say that they are confused, that they
are looking for value in the wrong place?  I argue that it is
eminently reasonable for fans to value fictional worlds as ends
– as abstract objects in their own right. Thus, it is reasonable
to value some works of fiction as mere means to the end of
exploring a fictional world. 
2. Central Cases: Fictional Works That Fans Love
Before we begin, it is necessary to get clear on a few
important terms.  We need to have at least some rough
account of what a fictional world is in order to discuss its
value.  In this paper I make use of Kendall Walton’s well-
known account of fictionality.  Walton notes that whether or
not a fictional world is constituted by a set of propositions, it is
at least strongly associated with a set of propositions, viz., the
set of propositions made fictional by a particular
representational work (or works).  So, the books of The Lord
of the Ring trilogy make it fictional that there are elves,
dwarves, and hobbits, that Gandalf and Saruman are wizards,
that Aragorn is a descendant of ancient kings, and so on. 
These propositions, and others like them, are made fictional by
these works insofar as the works function in a game of make-
believe.  Walton puts it this way:
It is the function of a representation to be used as a
prop in certain sorts of games.  Function in this case
might be thought of as a matter of there being rules or
conventions about how the work is to be used. 
Appreciators are supposed to be playing certain sorts of
games with the work.… So we can say that what is
fictional in a work is what appreciators of it (qua
appreciators of it) are to imagine.[5]
The world of a work has to do with what a work makes
fictional, and a world makes certain things fictional by
prescribing audiences to imagine in accordance with a set of
conventions. 
Similarly, Nicholas Wolterstorff’s account of fictional worlds is
that a work projects a fictional world by indicating or making
understood that certain propositions are to be understood as
holding in that world.[6]  Central to his view is also the idea
that the author uses the work to indicate to audiences what
they are to imagine about the world.  One difference between
Wolterstorff and Walton is that, according to Wolterstorff,
fictional worlds consist of propositions and hence of states of
affairs, whereas Walton avoids making this metaphysical
commitment.  By understanding worlds in terms of what is
fictional, and what is fictional in terms of the prescriptive rules
that govern imaginative games, Walton does not offer an
ontology of fictional worlds.  Worlds are not constituted by
objects or states of affairs but by a set of (mostly implicit)
agreements that govern how we understand fiction.  In what
follows, I use Walton’s terminology, though the differences
between Wolterstorff’s and Walton’s theories do not affect the
argument of the paper.
The examples I consider here come from what I will call
central cases.  Every work of fiction (even those that are not
considered works of literature, such as Francis Bacon’s New
Atlantis[7] ) projects a fictional world, and any fictional world
might, in principle, have the sort of value I describe here.  The
central cases are those in which a certain kind of evaluation,
which emphasizes features of the world independent of the
work, becomes dominant.  The central cases tend to be works
of mass popular art rather than works of “high” art.  This is a
contingent fact, however, and there are exceptions – the
Dublin of Joyce’s Ulysses has attracted a great deal of the kind
of interest I describe here, despite the fact that Ulysses is
considered to be great literature.  What follows are general
principles, not universal laws.  It is, however, helpful to focus
on the class of cases that have most often tended to give rise
to fascination with fictional worlds.  The central cases are
interesting because the fictional worlds (such as Middle-Earth)
tend to be evaluated much more highly than the
corresponding works (e.g., The Lord of the Rings).  This is not
the case, for example, with Joyce’s Dublin and Ulysses.   Since
Ulysses is generally considered to be one of the greatest
works of literature written in English, no one wonders why
Bloomsday is widely celebrated or why Joyce’s depiction of
Dublin holds such fascination for so many admirers.
Central cases tend to have three features:
(1) They are works that, taken together, are best understood
as telling us about a single world.  Walton assumes for the
sake of simplicity that there is a one-to-one correspondence
between works and worlds, but it is clear that this is often not
the case.  Even if we count the three volumes of The Lord of
the Rings as one book, Tolkien wrote other books, most
famously The Hobbit and The Silmarillion, which take place in
the same world.  Not only do the individual episodes of the
1960’s television series Star Trek all take place in the same
fictional world, but other television series (Star Trek: The Next
Generation, Star Trek: Deep Space Nine, and so on) also take
place in that same world.  So we can speak of sets of works
where every member of that set describes the same world.
To establish that a set of works describes a single world, it is
not sufficient to show that the works were created by a single
artist in a characteristic style.[8]  Compare Sir Arthur Conan
Doyle's Sherlock Holmes stories with the novels of Jane
Austen.  Austen's books (except perhaps Northanger Abbey)
share a great deal in common with one another: they have
similar settings, character types, themes, and moods.  But no
specific characters, places, or fictional events from one book
recur in any of the others.  Emma does not make it fictional
that there is a Mr. Darcy or a place called Pemberley.  It does
not specifically deny these things, but it is not part of the
world of Emma that such people or places exist. 
By contrast, in the Sherlock Holmes novels and stories, facts
established in one work are normally taken as facts in later
works.  Characters recur: not only Holmes and Watson, but
Inspector Lestrade, Mrs. Hudson, and many others.  Places,
facts, and events discussed in one story are overtly or
obliquely referenced in later stories.  For example, in Doyle’s
“The Adventure of the Greek Interpreter,” we are told that
Mycroft Holmes has an important job with the British
government.  A later story, “The Adventure of the Bruce-
Partington Plans” makes reference to this previously
established “fact.”  (This is not to say that any two works that
share a world thereby share a cast of characters.  That Mycroft
Holmes is part of Doyle’s London does not imply that he is part
of Hound of the Baskervilles.)  Similarly, Virginia Woolf’s
character Mrs. Dalloway appears in both the eponymous novel
and The Voyage Out, suggesting that at least these two works
share a world.[9]  Common authorship and stylistic similarity
are not sufficient to establish that different works share a
world. 
Nor are a common author and style necessary.  Two works of
fiction might be quite different stylistically, even created by
different authors, and yet share a common world, as Michael
Chabon’s novel, The Final Solution, demonstrates.  The Final
Solution includes Sherlock Holmes as a character (although he
is not named) and clearly is meant to take place after a
number of events in Holmes’ life that we know about from the
original stories, but the book introduces distinctly twentieth-
century themes, and its mood is different from that of Doyle’s
own stories.  Nonetheless, the world of The Final Solution is
the same as the world of Hound of the Baskervilles.
(2) Such works tend to be episodic.  Like Doyle’s Sherlock
Holmes stories or the individual episodes of the Star Trek
television program, the separate works each tell individual,
narratively complete stories that are chronologically ordered in
relation to one another.  This order might sometimes be
difficult to make out and need not correspond to the order in
which these works were created.  One interesting feature of an
episodic set of works of this kind is that it is made fictional
that there are gaps between the times covered by distinct
works during which the characters continue to act and
interact.  They continue about their lives both before and after
each work (unless, of course, it is made fictional that they
die). 
(3) These works usually, though not always, describe worlds
that are relatively distant from our own in important ways,
such as scientifically, technologically, geographically, culturally,
or linguistically.  The worlds described in such works are very
unlike ours and, as such, there is a great deal to tell the
reader in a work about this world about what is and is not the
case, culturally, technologically, and so on.  Many of the best
known sets of works I discuss here belong to the genres of
science fiction and fantasy.
These three features are important because they help to
nurture a certain type of interest in audiences.  The first
feature is particularly important in getting fans interested in
works as a means of accessing a world.  The existence of
multiple narrative works telling different stories set in the
same “place” generates questions about that place.  The
second and third features are perhaps less important, but the
episodic gaps and fantastical elements can both focus audience
attention on what is part of the world but not part of the
story.  These three features, however, are not meant to be
necessary or sufficient.  The idea is that the presence of these
three features imperfectly tracks the sets of fictional works
that have attracted fan interest.  (As noted earlier, there are
exceptions; Ulysses has at most one of those features, and yet
has a deep fan base.)  Fan interest and engagement are
important because, as we shall see, the collaborative activity
of fans is part of what makes the world worth caring about.
Prominent examples include the books, movies, and other
fictional works that describe the fantasy world called Middle-
Earth, the first of which were authored by J.R.R. Tolkien; the
many books, films, and television series taking place in the
futuristic world of Star Trek, the first of which were created by
Gene Rodenberry; the Harry Potter books by J.K. Rowling and
films set in Hogwarts and related magical lands; and the
various stories, novels, and films by Sir Arthur Conan Doyle
(and others) which are set in a rather dark and eccentric
version of Victorian London; the various books, games, and
films describing Frank Herbert’s Dune; and the various works
contributing to Joss Whedon’s “Buffyverse.”  There are often
arguments among fans about which works properly belong in
the set.  The Star Trek novels are not generally considered to
be proper members of the “canonical” set, while the films are;
the reverse is true with The Lord of the Rings. 
I talk of fans rather than audiences because it is self-described
fans who most often make the sorts of judgments that seem
so at odds with those of the critics.  “Fan” is an abbreviation
for “fanatic,” and no doubt some fans improperly and
obsessively spend their time imagining and discussing the
worlds of fictional works.  It is no part of my aim here to
defend extreme fanatical devotion to fictional works or to
discuss other dangers (moral or psychological) associated with
obsessive interests in works of art.
However, I do want to defend one approach to evaluating art
which is characteristic of fan interest: fans often desire to
experience certain artworks because they wish to gain
imaginative access to the work’s corresponding world.  What is
fan interest in these works like?  How does it differ from a
critic’s approach to such a work or from a more conventional
approach to judging works of fiction?
3. Valuing Fictional Works Instrumentally
Fans value some works of fiction instrumentally.  Of course,
some philosophers think that all who value artworks do so
instrumentally, because they think that all artworks are valued
for the pleasure that they produce.[10]  But even if this were
so, fan interest would be instrumental in a different way. 
Where in other cases the object of the audience’s attention is
on what is made fictional by that particular artwork (or
performance thereof), the central object of fan interest is the
larger fictional world in which the story of the artwork is
embedded.  The fan’s pleasure arises from attention to the
fictional world, not just from attention to what the particular
fictional work makes fictional in that world.[11]  To judge a
fictional work as a fan is to attend first and foremost to what
the work makes fictional reveals about the fictional world,
where the fictional world is thought of as having an
independent existence.  Here are three pieces of evidence
which suggest that fan interest in the central cases often
focuses primarily on the works’ world, not on other, perhaps
more literary, elements of the work. 
(1) Fans are willing to spend significant amounts of time and
money to acquire objects which are ancillary to the originating
artworks, but which can serve as props for exploring the larger
fictional worlds.  After the 1977 film Star Wars was released,
many fans bought dolls and games representing not only the
main characters (e.g., Han Solo, Princess Leia), but also, more
surprisingly, characters who barely appeared in the film. 
Some of these characters (e.g., Hammerhead) were not even
given names in the film itself, and appeared for only moments
in the background.  Nonetheless, the toys representing them
became popular.  Those who bought these toys to play with
them did so not in order to reenact the storyline told in the
movie in which these characters barely featured, but in order
to imagine new stories that take place in that world.
Fictional objects, such as swords, and even whole characters in
the on-line fictional world of Everquest, for example, can be
bought and sold, sometimes for thousands of dollars.  The
merchandising associated with books like Lord of the Rings or
films like Star Wars is immensely profitable, but money is not
the only measure of worth.  Fans also create their own
costumes, swords, maps, and other props to expand their
interaction with these fictional worlds, spending a great deal of
time and effort in the process.
(2) These fictional worlds often contain puzzles for fans to
solve.  Of course, many fictional works contain puzzles also:
mysteries and crime fictions call for their audiences to find the
killer, for example.  However, fans also puzzle over different
sorts of problems.  For example, fans disagree over how many
wives Dr. Watson had over the course of his life.[12] 
References” by Dr. Watson `in different stories sometimes
appear inconsistent, since he was apparently made a widower
at least once, but appears to have been married both before
meeting this wife, and afterwards.  The work (or set of works),
taken as a whole, is not merely silent on these details, but
confusing.  Fans of the series offer differing theories about how
many wives Watson had and when he married each.  There
are a number of distinct solutions that are consistent with the
evidence given in each story.  The puzzle arises in part
because the world of Holmes seems to transcend the sixty
individual stories and novels; fans want to bring these various
glimpses of the world into a consistent whole.  Also, because
of the episodic nature of the stories, by imposing a chronology
on the world with periodic gaps fills in some details while
omitting others.
The existence of such puzzles in the fictional worlds, not just in
the works, creates a cognitive interest in the worlds
themselves.[13]  Individual works of art are mostly consistent,
so the puzzles would not arise unless fans concerned
themselves with the worlds beyond those works.  While the
presence of large numbers of direct contradictions tends to
decrease fan interest in such worlds, the presence of a few
generates opportunities for creative problem-solving, allowing
fans to offer up new fictional possibilities to reconcile
apparently conflicting features of that world.[14]  This, in turn,
increases the complexity and even the “realism” of these
fictional worlds, since our own real-world experiences of course
contain many apparently contradictory and puzzling features. 
Fictional worlds seem to be valued most when they pose
enough such problems to generate interest, while creating in
general a coherent and internally consistent world.
(3) These fictional worlds afford opportunities for imaginative
participation well beyond the imaginative games proper to the
works that generate them.  It is a familiar idea that works of
fiction are valuable in part because they direct audiences to
imagine the events and characters described in them.  But
certain fictional worlds also seem to invite audiences to
imagine other stories that are not described in those works but
rather are suggested by features of the world of the work.  In
some cases, other artists may even create new works of art
meant to take place in a fictional world that is already
established (as Michael Chabon did).  More commonly,
however, people use these worlds as backdrops for more
informal game-playing, writing, or creative expression that
might not qualify as art-making.  The internet has volumes of
“fan fiction” that take place in the worlds of Star Trek and Lord
of the Rings.  Role-playing games (such as Dungeons and
Dragons) offer participants the opportunity to populate
fictional worlds with new characters, and to create new
fictional places, events, and objects that become part of that
world.  Fans paint pictures to accompany works of literature or
tell stories that fill in gaps between events portrayed television
episodes.[15]  Rich fictional worlds do more than afford
opportunities for these creative experiences; in some cases,
the original artists take steps to encourage such participation.
Michael Chabon notes that both Sherlock Holmes stories and
The Lord of the Rings share this quality:
Readers of Tolkien often recall the strange narrative
impulse engendered by those marginal regions named
and labeled on the books’ endpaper maps, yet never
visited or even referred to by the characters in The Lord
of the Rings.  All enduring popular literature has this
open-ended quality, and extends an invitation to the
reader to continue, on his or her own, with the
adventure.  Through a combination of trompe l’oeil
allusions [sic] of imaginative persistence of vision, it
creates a sense of an infinite horizon of play, an endless
game board; it spawns, without trying, a thousand
sequels, diagrams, and web sites.[16]
A world rich with detail, scientific, religious, cultural, historical,
or technological, can never be so rich that it prevents
audiences from expanding the world further.  In creating
Middle-Earth, Tolkien created several new languages, a
detailed mythology, history covering thousands of years, and
even a cosmogony.  Minor characters, as well as larger ones,
were provided with a rich back-story and genealogy.  This
richness of detail, however, serves to generate more
possibilities:  each proposition made fictional suggests other
possibilities not yet settled.  The details provided create
interest and the details inevitably missing encourage creative
contributions to the world.  So fictional worlds, especially
those that are generated by a series of separate episodic and
fantastic fictional works, are well-suited to encourage active
creative expression on the part of the audience.  It is for this
reason that many of these fictional worlds can be found
described in a variety of different media:  film, television,
song, comic, novel, role-playing game, video game, short
story, musical, and more.  The explosion of works about these
worlds is evidence of the worlds’ tendency to promote creative
exploration. 
4.  It Can Be Reasonable to Value Fictional Works
Instrumentally
If the practices just described are sometimes reasonable and
not merely a waste of time, it must be because the fictional
worlds to which fictional works are just means are rightly and
reasonably valued for their own sakes.  What makes it
reasonable to value fictional worlds for their own sakes is that
these worlds themselves have aesthetic value.[17]  A fictional
world can be rich, elegant, cohesive, chaotic, mythic, or
serene, and they can be rightly valued for these reasons. 
Fictional worlds are strange candidates for bearers of aesthetic
value.  They are: (1) non-perceptible and (2) in the typical
case, at least, a kind of byproduct of art making rather than
its central aim.  Either of these facts may be taken as a reason
for thinking that fictional worlds cannot have aesthetic value.
(1) Some philosophers have claimed that only perceptible
objects can have aesthetic value.  Nick Zangwill, for example,
claims that beauty and related predicates can only apply to
sensory objects.[18]  This leads him to deny that a
mathematical proof or any other abstract object can be
beautiful.  Indeed, literary content (as opposed to the sensory
character of the language) cannot be beautiful, according to
Zangwill, and so cannot have aesthetic value, though it can
have other artistic values.  The use of terms like “beauty” to
describe non-perceptual objects is metaphorical.  He argues
for this claim by drawing a distinction.  Abstract objects are
only called “beautiful” because they also serve some other
predetermined purpose, whereas perceptual objects are called
beautiful without reference to any purpose.
What could motivate us to go one way or another over
the question of whether our application of aesthetic
terms to abstract objects, like proofs, theories, or chess
moves, is metaphorical?  One argument for saying that
they are applied metaphorically is that in all these
cases, the abstract entity has a purpose.  The point of a
mathematical or logical proof is to demonstrate a truth
on the basis of other truths.  The point of a scientific
theory is to explain the data.  And the point of a chess
move is to win.  Our admiration of a good proof, theory,
or chess move turns solely on its effectiveness in
attaining these ends, or else in having properties which
make attaining these ends likely.[19]
There are two replies to Zangwill’s argument.  First, it is far
from clear that fictional worlds, considered as abstract objects,
have fixed ends, as scientific theories and logical proofs do. 
Perhaps Zangwill would reply that the end of say, Middle-
Earth, is to enrich the experience of readingThe Lord of the
Rings.  But if so, that is an aesthetic purpose, not an epistemic
or technological one.  And thus it is not so different from the
sort of purpose that any aspect of an artwork may be said to
have.  Aristotle tells us that, in tragedy, the purpose of song
and spectacle is to serve the plot, but one would not want to
conclude that neither song nor spectacle can be beautiful.
Second, suppose that the use of aesthetic terms is
metaphorical in the case of abstract objects.  So what?  The
point is simply that it is reasonable for fans to value fictional
worlds aesthetically, and to value fictional works insofar as
they promote access to these fictional worlds.  If the
application of aesthetic terms and evaluations to fictional
worlds is metaphorical, as Zangwill maintains, that need not
mean that it is inappropriate or unreasonable. Fictional worlds,
like mathematical proofs, are rightly called beautiful when it
makes good sense to value them in something like the way in
which one values an artwork or natural scene: with
contemplative enjoyment and delight.
(2) The second worry is that these abstract objects, fictional
worlds, are not proper objects of admiration because they
were not intentionally created.  Now in some cases this
objection does not apply.  In J.R.R. Tolkien’s essay “On Fairy-
stories,” he describes a process of creating fictional worlds that
he calls “Sub-creation.”[20] (Tolkein is alluding to the act of
creation described in Genesis).  Sub-creation is the intentional
creation of an abstract object, a fictional world, through
designing various props (maps, genealogical charts, etc.) that
are not themselves artworks.  Tolkien quite deliberately set
out to design features of his imaginary world that he never
intended to appear in any work of fiction. 
However, in many (perhaps most) cases, the idea of creating a
fictional world beyond what is needed for the story may never
cross the creator’s mind.  This seems to have been the case
with Doyle’s London.  In such cases, it may seem very odd to
value a fictional world in the way one values an artwork.  That
is not to say that an object that has not been intentionally
created cannot be valued aesthetically:  natural objects are
reasonably called beautiful if anything is.  But a fictional world
is a kind of non-perceptual byproduct of an otherwise
intentional act. 
It is of course strange to value a byproduct of the art-making
process but it is not thereby unreasonable.  A fictional world is
in some sense a facsimile of the actual world.  And our world
gives rise to all kinds of intrinsic interests:  anthropological,
linguistic, biological, cultural, moral, and scientific.  These
interests are not always instrumental.  Often we just want to
understand our world better and we delight in learning about
it.  What is perhaps surprising is that we can also delight in
“learning” about fictional worlds.  While there is no epistemic
value in learning about fictional worlds (unless the exercise of
cognitive faculties is itself indirectly epistemically valuable),
there is good reason to think that the enjoyment we find in
exploring worlds should not depend on their epistemic value. 
Aristotle wrote:
Also (ii) everyone delights in representations .… The
cause of this is that learning is most pleasant, not only
for philosophers, but for others likewise (but they share
in it to a small extent).  For this reason they delight in
seeing images, because it comes about that they learn
as they observe, and infer what each thing is. …[21]
The pleasure that Aristotle points to here lies in recognition,
and there is no reason that such recognition cannot happen in
fictional worlds.  On reading Tolkein’s Silmarillion, one
recognizes features of Middle-Earth that are alluded to only
briefly in songs from The Lord of the Rings. 
There is, however, a further objection to attributing aesthetic
value to fictional worlds, at least value not possessed by the
fictional works corresponding to those worlds.  One may claim
that the notion of a fictional world that is needed is simply not
available.   To see this, we need to return to Kendall Walton’s
account of fictional worlds.  If we understand “work” and
“world” in the way Walton does, as sets of prescriptions to
imagine, then whence do these prescriptions arise?  Walton
considers two possibilities.  He distinguishes between what he
calls “game worlds” and “work worlds.”  Game worlds are
“worlds of games that appreciators play with representational
works.”[22]  There are infinitely many game worlds for each
work, as each appreciator can generate her own imaginative
rules, and each can incorporate first person imaginings as well
(e.g., “I am looking at the Gates of Mordor”).   These worlds
will vary greatly from one appreciator to the next, and the
prescriptions are an aggregate of those generated by the
work, as well as the prescriptions that the appreciator herself
deliberately or implicitly adopts.   A work world, by contrast, is
the world generated by any person who follows all and only
the prescriptions made by the work.  Walton notes that the
work worlds will be the same for everyone who treats the work
as a prop and imagines accordingly; game worlds will vary
from person to person.  These, Walton claims, are the only two
choices.  He argues,
 If work worlds are not distinct from game worlds in
which the works are props, how are we to decide which
of the worlds of the various games that different
appreciators … play with La Grande Jatte is to be
identified with the world of La Grande Jatte?  If this
cannot be decided nonarbitrarily, we are forced to
regard the world of the painting as a world over and
above those of appreciator’s games.[23]
A world “over and above” those of the games people play
would be a new entity for which we’d need an ontological
account.  Walton’s theory aims to make such ontologies
unnecessary.  In short, Walton argues that there are only two
reasonable ways to delineate the presumptions that constitute
fictional worlds.[24]  Walton’s solution is to say that the work
world is related to the game world by being associated with all
and only what is made fictional in all of the game worlds of
that work.  The dilemma for fans who would value these works
as means to an independently valued fictional world is whether
that fictional world is a game world, which would be different
for each person, or a work world, in which case it is not
independent of the works that generate it?  Neither of these
options yields a single world that could reasonably be seen as
distinct from the originating work.
The worlds we have been talking about here are all worlds
that are products of more than one work of art.  But we
cannot simply modify Walton’s account by saying that the
work world comprises all the worlds of all of the relevant
works.  Such a modification would present two problems. 
First, it is difficult to see how one could say which works are
the relevant works without making reference to the worlds
that those works describe, and thus without being circular. 
Second, as we have already seen, the works that generate
these worlds often contain conflicting prescriptions.  The Lord
of the Rings makes it fictional that Glorfindel is an elf of
Elrond’s house; The Simarillion seems to describe Glorfindel as
a quite different person.  One cannot talk of the fictional world
of these books by simply aggregating the particular works’
prescriptions about this world. 
The way out of Walton’s dilemma is to specify which rules
govern what is to be imagined, where the rules are not merely
an aggregate of those that govern each work world, and are at
the same time more than the idiosyncratic game worlds of an
individual fan.  And there is such a way.  Persistent
communities of fans, sometimes in collaboration with artists,
can create a relatively stable consensus about the
prescriptions to follow in imagining a fictional world. 
Communities of fans who share an interest in a set of fictional
works come to agree among themselves on a set of standards
about what is to be imagined with regard to the fictional
world.  As when children collaborate to create a new make-
believe game, the agreement on what is to be imagined
evolves over time, and is both explicit and implicit.  Call the
worlds generated by such methods “fan worlds;” like game
worlds, they extend beyond the prescriptions made in the
work itself but they belong and apply to communities of
appreciators rather than to lone individuals.
Fans tend to defer to the original authors of the fictional works
with regard to the prescriptions that define the fan worlds, but
the views of the authors are not absolute, and fans may agree
to set aside an author’s prescriptions in favor of a set of
prescriptions that they think is more consistent or more
exciting, given everything else that is to be imagined about
the fan world.  Typically, a kind of reflective equilibrium takes
hold between the world of the individual works and the fan
world of the fictional work.  While some works, typically those
written by the author or group of authors who originated the
set of works, are regarded as “canon” and are not revisable,
other, non-canonical works are revisable in light of other
things we take to be true about the world.  Even elements of
canonical works might be seen as revisable if they are
contradicted by other prescriptions in other canonical works. 
This distinction between “canon” and “non-canon,” while
difficult to defend in principle, is common in practice. 
And of course, fans can and do split into smaller communities
over such questions, with each community of fans adopting a
slightly different set of prescriptions.  The fact that it will often
be difficult to specify exactly what constitutes a fan
community, or precisely which imaginative prescriptions hold
in a particular fan world, however, does not undermine the
view.  Work-worlds face similar difficulties, and philosophers
and critics continue to argue about how works are to be
interpreted and what exactly is to be imagined.  The central
point is just that communities of fans can collaboratively
imagine fictional fan worlds that are neither game-worlds nor
work-worlds but something in between, sustained by mutual
discussion and imaginative collaboration.
The central cases are central for just this reason:  they are the
sorts of works that are most apt to attract fan interest of this
kind.  And it is communities of fans, working and playing
together, who create and sustain the fan worlds, giving them a
status and interest greater than, or at least distinct from, the
originating works.  In principle, the world of any work can be
valued in this way; in practice, few are.
Fan worlds sometimes have a prevailing tone which dictates
the way in which causal or historical events must occur in that
world.  In the world of Star Trek, every event that seems
magical or divine must be given a technological explanation
(even if that explanation is itself mystifying).  A novel taking
place in the world of Star Trek in which a character used magic
to rescue her ship from danger would violate the implicit rules
and tone of that world, even if it did not expressly contradict
any of the specific prescriptions made by any of the original
fictional works.  These fictional worlds, and others like them,
have ways in which things are done.  Works or games that
contradict these “ways” are appropriately criticized.  This
suggests that fictional worlds sometimes have the kinds of
attributes necessary for aesthetic evaluation: Gibson’s
cyberpunk world may be valued for its bleakness, Herbert’s
Dune for its mythic character, the world of Star Trek for its
optimism.  Other worlds, such as the world of Superman, are
appropriately criticized for their glaring inconsistencies and
their lack of any consistent mood or tone.  In Superman’s
world, things can happen in just about any way you like.
However, one may object that while fictional worlds can and
should be valued aesthetically, the aesthetic value of these
worlds is merely a reflection of the value of the work(s) with
which they are associated.[25]  Superman’s world is
inconsistent because the comic books from which it originated
are inconsistent; if the world of Dune is mythic, that is
because the Dune novels are so.  If the aesthetic character of
fictional worlds merely reflects the aesthetic character of the
originating works, then how could Tolkien’s set of rather
mediocre novels give rise to one of the most admired fictional
worlds?
The aesthetic qualities of worlds are indeed dependent on the
aesthetic qualities of the originating works, but this
dependence is not perfect: sometimes the aesthetic qualities
of worlds will differ from those of the originating works.  This
is possible for a number of reasons.  First, even if the work
and world have the same qualities, those qualities can be
aesthetically approbatory in the world and disapprobatory in
the work, or vice versa.  For example, The Lord of the Rings
includes excerpts from, and references to, epic songs and
legends detailing ancient history that is not directly pertinent
to the story.  The work has a superfluity of historical and
cultural detail.  From the point of view of the story, this may
rightly be considered a demerit.  The story becomes stilted
and confusing, because these details add nothing to one’s
understanding of the characters or themes in the story. 
However, this same superfluity of historical detail is one of the
best qualities of the fictional world.  The richness and
complexity burden a story but liberate a world, creating more
possibilities for imaginative exploration.[26]
Second, many of the qualities of works are not thereby
qualities of worlds.  A story told in verse will have many poetic
qualities, but none of these will be qualities of the counterpart
world.  Third, when we are dealing, as in the central cases,
with a number of different works, often in different media, all
of which describe the same worlds, it is plausible that these
works will have a great variety of aesthetic qualities.  In some
cases, there is a canonical work or works whose qualities are
most important.  But in many cases this is not clear.  The
aesthetic qualities of the world will therefore be shared with
some but not all of the associated works.
Fourth, as we have already seen, fan worlds are created not
just by works but by communities of fans, and their implicit
agreements about what is to be imagined.  Fans may go
beyond the original works to posit fictional truths, which in
turn give rise to aesthetic qualities not prescribed by the
original works.  The works, however, still play a role here. 
Some works of fiction, particularly those in the central cases,
have what Chabon called an “open-ended quality,” so that the
features of the world are importantly underdetermined by the
work.  It is true that this “open-endedness” can be done well
or badly, and that whether it is done well or badly is relevant
to the literary value of the work.  But even poorly handled
open-endedness can have a positive effect on the value of the
world.  As discussed earlier, many of the most interesting
puzzles and features of Doyle’s London seem to be the result
of errors on Doyle’s part, which may rightly be seen as flaws in
the original short stories. 
For these reasons, the value of fictional worlds cannot always
be simply reduced to the value of the originating works.  Some
works, like The Lord of the Rings, fail as literature but succeed
as worlds because the literary flaws either do not affect the
world’s value, or even affect it positively because the work’s
open-endedness vastly increases the possibilities for value in
the imagined world.
Because some fictional worlds are appropriately distinguished
from the work-worlds of the individual works that give rise to
them, it is not surprising that we should find that these fan
worlds attract more attention and interest than others do.  In
these cases, the fictional works sometimes play a merely
instrumental role.  They are valued because they provide
access to an imagined world which has rich cognitive, creative,
and aesthetic value, and not because the fictional work has
great value in its own right.  This is not to say that every world
that fans like is thereby valuable: a world is valuable if fans
rightly or reasonably value it.  Some worlds might be very
popular but not worthy of that popularity.  Sometimes,
however, fans are drawn to certain works because of the real
value of the world that these works describe.  While critics
may focus on the flaws of the works qua artworks, many fans
look instead to the enormous richness of the world that lies
beyond the particular work.[27]
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